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 Abstract:  Recent years have seen an increase of interest on the part of human rights the-
orists in the “supply-side” of human rights, i.e., in the duties or obligations correlative 
to human rights. Nevertheless, faced with the practically urgent and seemingly simple 
question of who owes the duties related to international human rights, few human rights 
theorists provide an elaborate answer. While some make a point of fitting the human rights 
practice and hence regard states as the sole human rights duty-bearers merely by referring 
to that practice, others criticize the “state-centric” approach to human rights duty-bearers 
and expand the scope of the latter to include any international institution beyond the state 
and even private actors. Curiously, however, even those more expansive accounts of human 
rights duty-bearers are usually very evasive about why it should be so and especially how 
it should work. The time has come to broach anew the issue of the bearers of human rights 
duties, and responsibilities of international institutions in human rights theory, addressing 
two challenges: focusing on relational and directed human rights duties specifically and 
not on duties of global justice in general, thereby distinguishing between human rights 
duty-bearers and other bearers of responsibilities for human rights, on the one hand, and 
accounting for and justifying the point of international human rights law and practice in 
this respect, thereby also securing internal arguments for reform, on the other. The essay’s 
argument is four-pronged. It starts with a few reminders about the relational nature of 
human rights and the relationship between human rights and duties and what this means 
for the specification of human rights duties. It then focuses more specifically on the iden-
tification of human rights duty-bearers, i.e., states and international institutions of 
jurisdiction like the European Union (EU), and the allocation of human rights duties to 
them. The third section of the article is devoted to the concurrent moral responsibilities for 
human rights that are incurred by other various responsibility-bearers outside institutions 
of jurisdiction. In the final section, the essay considers the (quiet) revolution potential of 
the EU’s fast-developing human rights’ duties, and discusses the normative implications of 
the development of universal international institutions’ human rights duties stricto sensu 
for international law and politics more generally. 
 I .  Introduction 
 Recent years have seen an increase in interest on the part of human 
rights theorists for the “supply-side” of human rights,  1  i.e., for the duties 
 *  Many thanks to the Liberty Fund, David Schmidtz and Carmen Pavel, to the other con-
tributors to this volume, and to two anonymous reviewers for their invitation and feedback. 
Special thanks also to Cristina Lafont and Leif Wenar for their generous comments and to 
Odile Ammann for her help with formatting. 
  1   See e.g., on that expression  Onora  O’Neill ,  “The Dark Side of Human Rights,”  Interna-
tional Affairs  81 , no.  2 ( 2005 ):  427 –39. 
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or obligations  2  correlative to human rights.  3  Nevertheless, faced with the 
practically urgent and seemingly simple question of  who owes the duties 
related to international human rights,  4  few human rights theorists provide 
an elaborate answer. While some make a point of accounting for the con-
temporary human rights practice and, based on that practice, regard states 
as the sole human rights duty-bearers,  5  other authors criticize the “state-
centric” approach to human rights duty-bearers  6  and expand the scope of 
the latter to include any international institution beyond the state,  7  and 
even private actors.  8  
 Curiously, however, even those more expansive accounts of human 
rights duty-bearers are usually very evasive about why duties can 
extend beyond the state and, especially, how this should work.  9  Thus, 
they remain very vague about the identity of human rights duty-bearers 
(captured loosely by the reference to “international institutions” or, 
worse, the “international community”), the relationships between those 
various duty-bearers and states  10  (some of them being referred to as 
“subsidiary,” “secondary,” “indirect,” or “residual”), and the nature 
and content of what they respectively owe (referred to interchangeably 
  2   I am using “duties” and “obligations” interchangeably. 
  3   See e.g.,  James  Nickel ,  “How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide,” 
 Human Rights Quarterly  15 , no.  1 ( 1993 ):  77 – 86 ;  James  Nickel ,  Making Sense of Human 
Rights ,  2nd ed. ( Oxford :  Blackwell ,  2007 ),  37 – 41 ;  Samantha  Besson ,  “The Allocation of 
Anti-poverty Rights Duties — Our Rights, but Whose Duties?” in  Krista Nadakavukaren 
 Schefer , ed.,  Duties to Address Poverty ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press ,  2013 ), 
 408 –31. 
  4   I am focusing on international human rights and understand them as being at once moral 
and legal rights. On the mutual relationship between domestic and international human 
rights and on their joint moral and legal dimensions, see Samantha Besson, “Human Rights 
and Constitutional Law,” in Rowan Cruft, Matthew Liao, and Massimo Renzo, eds.,  Oxford 
Handbook on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 279–99. 
  5   See e.g., Charles R. Beitz,  The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 109–10, 113–17, 122–25 and 160–74;  Joseph  Raz ,  “Human Rights without Founda-
tions,” in  Samantha  Besson and  John  Tasioulas (eds),  The Philosophy of International Law 
( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  2010 ),  321 –37. 
  6   Cristina Lafont, “Human Rights and the Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,” 
 Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Politica II, no. 1 (2013): 1–33, 6 – 7. See also  Cristina  Lafont , 
 “Accountability and Global Governance: Challenging the State-Centric Conception of 
Human Rights,”  Ethics and Global Politics  3 , no.  3 ( 2010 ):  193 – 215 . 
  7   See e.g., Nickel, “How Human Rights”; Nickel,  Making Sense of Human Rights , 38 – 41; 
Lafont, “Human Rights.” 
  8   See e.g.,  Thomas  Pogge ,  World Poverty and Human Rights, Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and 
Reforms ,  2nd ed. ( Cambridge :  Polity Press,  2008 ) ;  James  Griffi n ,  On Human Rights ( Oxford : 
 Oxford University Press ,  2008 ) ;  John  Tasioulas ,  “Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights,” 
 Current Legal Problems  65 ( 2012 ):  1 – 30 . 
  9   See, however,  H.  Shue ,  Basic Rights ,  2nd ed. ( Princeton, NJ :  Princeton University Press , 
 1996 ),  157 ;  David  Miller ,  “Distributing Responsibilities,”  Journal of Political Philosophy  9 , 
no.  4 ( 2001 ):  453 –71. 
  10   See e.g., Nickel, “How Human Rights,” 81 – 82, 85; Nickel,  Making Sense of Human Rights , 
38–39; Griffi n,  On Human Rights , 104–5; Lafont, “Human Rights,” 27. 
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as “duties” or “responsibilities”  11  or as duties/responsibilities to either 
“respect” or to “promote” human rights  12  ). 
 More specifically, there are two methodological problems with many 
theorists’ accounts of the duty-bearers of human rights. The first difficulty 
is the conflation of global justice and human rights and, accordingly, the 
confusion between this debate about the supply-side of human rights and 
another one in which statist accounts of justice oppose globalist ones.  13  
While human rights may be regarded as part of global justice and even a 
central part, they do not exhaust it.  14  Straddling those very different issues 
has impoverished accounts of human rights duties by focusing only on 
certain duties (to protect and provide) and not on others (to respect), but 
also only on certain (basic) rights and not on others. More generally, this 
conflation of responsibilities under global justice and human rights duties 
obliterates the line between the duties that are owed to human right-holders 
and the other sorts of moral responsibilities for human rights that are not 
owed to them.  15  It is as if by wanting so much to focus on the supply-side 
of human rights, those authors fell prey to the reverse danger of forget-
ting the existence of right-holders in the first place and hence the directed 
nature of human rights duties. 
 A second difficulty with current accounts of human rights duty-bearers 
is that most of them are unconcerned with the state of international law 
on the question  16  and do not attempt to account for the fact that states 
and some rare international institutions,  17  like the European Union (EU), 
are the sole duty-bearers under international human rights law, and that 
other actors incur more diffuse responsibilities at most for human rights.  18  
This may be either because, for them, human rights theory is not about 
accounting for human rights practice, or because they simply regard that 
legal practice as morally wrong and in need of reform. This posture not 
only jeopardizes the justification for the latter theories’ claim to reform 
  11   See e.g., Andrew Kuper, “Introduction: The Responsibilities Approach to Human 
Rights,” in  Global Responsibilities: Who Must Deliver on Human Rights? (New York: Routledge, 
2005), ix–xxii; Thomas Pogge, “Human Rights and Human Responsibilities,” in Kuper, ed., 
 Global Responsibilities , 3–35;  Leif  Wenar ,  “Responsibility and Severe Poverty,” in  Pogge , ed., 
 Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? ( Oxford :  Oxford 
University Press ,  2007 ),  255 . 
  12   See e.g., Beitz,  The Idea of Human Rights , 109–10. 
  13   See  Thomas  Nagel ,  “The Problem of Global Justice,”  Philosophy and Public Affairs  33 , no.  2 
( 2005 ):  113 – 47. 
  14   See also Griffi n,  On Human Rights , 65. 
  15   See e.g., Kuper, “Introduction,” xxii; Pogge, “Human Rights and Human Responsibilities”; 
Wenar, “Responsibility and Severe Poverty.” 
  16   See, however, Nickel,  Making Sense of Human Rights , 38–39; Beitz,  The Idea of Human 
Rights , 109–10, 113–17. 
  17   I will refer to international “institutions” instead of “organizations” to refer to all past, 
existing, and future institutions that are neither states nor private actors, and not only to 
existing international organizations under international law. 
  18   See e.g.,  Olivier de  Schutter ,  International Human Rights Law ,  2nd ed . ( Cambridge : 
 Cambridge University Press ,  2014 ),  147 ff. 
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the practice, but it also leads them to underestimate important normative 
resources available in the legal practice of human rights. The view that 
states and international institutions are the sole bearers of human rights 
duties corresponds to a practice that has constantly been contested and 
justified in international law, including by international lawyers them-
selves. It does not, in other words, amount to a “truism.”  19  
 The time has come to broach anew the issue of the bearers of human 
rights duties and the responsibilities of international institutions in 
human rights theory. Doing so requires addressing two challenges: first, 
focusing on relational and directed human rights duties specifically rather 
than on duties of global justice in general, thereby distinguishing between 
human rights duty-bearers and other bearers of responsibilities for human 
rights; and second, accounting for and justifying the point of international 
human rights law and practice, thereby also securing internal arguments 
for reform. 
 Methodologically, this makes this essay part and parcel of the more gen-
eral project to develop a normative legal theory of human rights.  20  Starting 
from legal questions and categories, it proposes a general interpretation of 
international human rights law. This implies identifying the justifications 
underpinning the current international human rights practice in order to 
present that practice in its best light. Like any legal interpretation, it is 
constrained and shaped by the normative practice of law, but it is also 
part of that practice and hence constrains it and shapes it in return. Thus, 
although the proposed legal theory of human rights is not trapped into 
the kind of normatively inert descriptions of the human rights practice 
one finds in “political” theories of human rights,  21  it is not free from that 
practice in the way that the practice-guiding normative accounts of moral 
human rights one finds in “ethical” theories are.  22  
 In a nutshell, there are two key notions one encounters in the interna-
tional human rights practice that can help us justify and improve it from 
within: “jurisdiction” and “responsibility.” First of all, based on the juris-
diction threshold for the application of international human rights law, 
I will argue that human rights should be understood as normative relation-
ships that correspond to relationships of jurisdiction. For reasons I will 
explain, such relationships must be institutional, even more so if they are 
to be democratic and, hence, egalitarian. Does this mean that only states 
may bear human rights duties? No. States do, of course, bear those duties, 
but so also does any international institution that can exercise jurisdiction 
and be organized democratically. To date, this is only the case for the EU. 
  19   Contra: Lafont, “Human Rights,” 6–7. 
  20   See  Samantha  Besson ,  “The Law in Human Rights Theory,”  Zeitschrift für Menschenrechte – 
Journal for Human Rights  7 ( 2013 ):  120 –50. 
  21   See e.g., Beitz,  The Idea of Human Rights . 
  22   See e.g., Griffi n,  On Human Rights ; Tasioulas, “Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights.” 
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Does it mean that other states and international institutions are off the 
hook for human rights? No, not at all. And here comes the second concept 
one encounters in the human rights practice: responsibilities for human 
rights. I will argue that responsibilities for human rights should be care-
fully distinguished from human rights’ duties. Responsibilities for the 
protection and promotion of human rights (by their respective states and 
international institutions of jurisdiction): are concurrent with the human 
rights duties of those states and institutions; bear on subjects other than 
those states and institutions, and in particular on other states, on interna-
tional institutions, and even on individuals; are not directed, and hence are 
not owed, to the human right-holders themselves; and, most of the time, 
have a different content than the human rights duties that they support. 
 My argument is four-pronged. It starts in Section II with a few 
reminders about the relational nature of human rights and what this 
means for the specification of human rights duties. Section III focuses 
more specifically on the identification of human rights duty-bearers, 
that is, institutions of jurisdiction, and the allocation of human rights 
duties to them. Section IV of the argument is devoted to the concurrent 
moral responsibilities for human rights that are incurred by other various 
responsibility-bearers outside institutions of jurisdiction. In Section V, 
the essay considers the (quiet) revolution potential of the EU’s fast-
developing human rights’ duties, and discusses the normative implica-
tions of the development of universal international institutions’ human 
rights duties  stricto sensu for international law and politics more gener-
ally. Section VI concludes. 
 II .  Human Rights as Normative Relations 
 Understanding the supply-side of human rights requires unpacking 
their relational structure and then sketching what the specification of their 
corresponding duties actually implies.. 
 A.  The relational structure of human rights and duties 
 Based on the practice of international human rights law, human rights 
may be regarded as a subset of rights that are both moral and legal in 
nature.  23   Qua right, a right gives a person (a right-holder) a claim to the 
respect of a duty by another person (the duty-bearer) whose duty is directed 
to the right-holder. As such, a right is a normative relation between a right-
holder and a duty-bearer, pertaining to a protected object. 
  23   See for a full account,  Samantha  Besson ,  “La structure et la nature des droits de l’homme,” 
in  Michel  Hottelier and  Maya  Hertig , eds.,  Introduction aux droits de l’homme ( Brussels : 
 Bruylant ,  2014 ),  19 – 38 . 
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 One characteristic of human rights in practice helps clarify their rela-
tional nature: their generality or equality.  24  Human rights are the equal 
rights of everyone who possesses them, independent of his or her status. 
Interestingly, equality is itself a (basic) relational or social status:  25  one is 
simultaneously a person valuable in herself and a person equal to others, 
that is, a person whose status and moral worth are defined by her moral 
relations to others.  26  Moreover, equal moral status is actually defined by 
reference to mutual moral entitlements or rights.  27  One may argue that 
human rights are constitutive of the fundamental equal status and mutual 
relationship of their holders as equal and mutual rights of all against 
all. It is by recognizing that each other’s fundamental interests require 
protection against general or standard threats that we acquire our equal 
moral status by virtue of an ensemble of human rights that protect us 
from such threats. 
 The relational or social nature of equal moral status implies that “the 
proper acknowledgement of a person’s moral status requires some sort of 
fundamental public recognition of equality.”  28  Equality is distinctly public 
or political, as a result. This applies, at least, when the conditions of a 
political community are fulfilled, i.e., when individuals share roughly equal 
and interdependent stakes, and when they stand in a social relationship to 
one another. The mutual constitution of human rights and equal political 
status explains why democracy is the political regime required by human 
rights, and why human rights are required in turn for democracy. Without 
understanding the relational and especially the egalitarian dimension of 
human rights as in the proposed reading, a central feature of human rights 
practice would get lost: their inherently political and democratic dimen-
sion (e.g., Article 8(2) European Convention of Human Rights [ECHR]).  29  
 Of course, moral and legal rights to membership of this kind cannot 
be guaranteed exclusively from within a given political community since 
they work as universal constraints on democratic sovereignty. This is why 
they are usually protected from the outside through international human 
rights law.  30  At the same time, however, to be democratically legitimate, 
such rights must be recognized legally through inclusive and delibera-
tive processes. The difficulty is that there is no universal political com-
munity where individuals may grant each other equal rights and where 
  24   See  Samantha  Besson ,  “The Egalitarian Dimension of Human Rights,”  Archiv für Sozial- 
und Rechtsphilosophie Beiheft  136 ( 2012 ):  19 – 52 . 
  25   See  Elizabeth S.  Anderson ,  “What Is the Point of Equality?”  Ethics  109 , no.  2 ( 1999 ):  289 , 
 313 . 
  26   See Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” 288–89. 
  27   See  Allen  Buchanan ,  “Moral Status and Human Enhancement,”  Philosophy and Public 
Affairs  37 , no.  4 ( 2009 ):  378 –79. 
  28   See Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” 288–89. 
  29   See e.g., European Court of Human Rights,  Zdanoka v. Latvia , March 16, 2006 (appl. no. 
58278/00). 
  30   See also  Ronald  Dworkin ,  Justice for Hedgehogs ( Harvard :  Belknap Press ,  2011 ),  335 –39. 
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052515000151
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 15:21:20, subject to the Cambridge Core
SAMANTHA BESSON250
those rights could constitute an equal political status. The answer to this 
riddle is to realize that the legalization of international human rights is a 
two-way street. The recognition and existence of those rights as interna-
tional human rights that constrain domestic polities ought to be based on 
democratic practices recognized domestically. And only those polities that 
respect international human rights are deemed legitimate in specifying 
the content of such rights and, hence, in contributing to the recognition 
and existence of such rights  qua international human rights; such rights 
will then constrain these polities in return. This is what I have referred 
to elsewhere as the mutual validation and legitimation of domestic and 
international human rights law.  31  
 International human rights norms guarantee rights to individuals both 
within their domestic community and — because international human 
rights are usually guaranteed  erga omnes — within the jurisdiction of other 
states. These rights correspond to each state’s duty to secure and ensure 
respect for “human rights” within their own jurisdiction. In that sense, 
international human rights duties are second-order duties of states to gen-
erate their own first-order duties to protect human rights under domestic 
law, i.e., international duties to have domestic duties.  32  These duties pro-
tect the universal moral right to have human rights, i.e., the right to equal 
membership in a moral-political community with all the human rights 
this status implies. 
 B.  The specification of human rights duties 
 As normative relations and claims, human rights give rise to duties. 
While human rights can be abstract, human rights duties must be spec-
ified in context by reference to a concrete threat to a protected interest.  33  
Any given human right amounts to a sufficient ground for holding other 
individuals under all the specific duties necessary to protect that interest 
against standard threats in different circumstances across time.  34  
 There are three separate sets of issues that need to be elucidated in this 
context: first, the specification of the content of human rights duties; 
second, the identification of human rights duty-bearers; and, finally, the 
assignment of human rights duties to those duty-bearers. 
  31   See  Samantha  Besson ,  “The Legitimate Authority of International Human Rights – On 
the Reciprocal Legitimation of Domestic and International Human Rights,” in  Andreas 
 Føllesdal , ed.,  The Legitimacy of Human Rights ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press , 
 2013 ),  32 – 43 . 
  32   See also O’Neill, “The Dark Side of Human Rights,” 433. 
  33   See  Joseph  Raz ,  “On the Nature of Rights,”  Mind  93 , no.  370 ( 1984 ):  196 , 200. 
  34   See  Jeremy  Waldron ,  “Introduction,” in  Theories of Rights ( New York :  Oxford University 
Press ,  1984 ),  10 – 11 ;  Charles R.  Beitz and  Robert E.  Goodin ,  “Introduction:  Basic Rights and 
Beyond,” in  Charles  Beitz and  Robert  Goodin , eds.,  Global Basic Rights ( Oxford :  Oxford 
University Press ,  2009 ), 1–24, at  10 . 
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 Starting with the question of the specification of the content of human 
rights duties, and following Shue’s seminal three-tier model, one usually 
distinguishes between negative duties to avoid depriving (respect), pos-
itive duties to protect from depriving (protect) and positive duties to aid 
the deprived (fulfill).  35  Positive duties arise to protect against the violation 
or nonfulfillment posed either by agents other than the duty-bearers, such 
as individuals, other states, or international institutions within the scope 
of jurisdiction of the duty-bearing state, or by natural elements. Such 
duties add a layer of protection to negative duties to avoid depriving. 
They entail either developing indirect institutional and legislative protec-
tion, or taking direct practical measures of protection. Positive duties to 
aid, finally, arise when negative duties to avoid or positive duties to pro-
tect have either been violated or not fulfilled sufficiently and where aid 
is needed. All of these duties, whether positive or negative, may be trig-
gered by all human rights without distinction.  36  It is important to stress 
that there could, of course, be many other types of human rights duties 
depending on the need for protection.  37  
 All three categories of duty mentioned could potentially arise concur-
rently if need be in a concrete case, even though they are articulated by 
reference to one another. The reason they could arise concurrently is to 
enable the burdens of duty to be spread across time and agents; otherwise, 
each duty could potentially amount to an unreasonable burden on a given 
agent.  38  Of course, not all human rights duties will be borne by the same 
human rights duty-bearers at the same time in the end.  39  
 III .  The Identification of Human Rights Duty-Bearers and the 
Allocation of Human  Rights Duties 
 Before human rights duties can be fairly and justifiably allocated to 
a specific duty-bearer, the latter must be identified as a potential duty-
bearer: first, generally, as an institution and, secondly, more specifically, as 
the institution that exercises jurisdiction over the right-holder. 
 A.  The institutional account of human rights duty-bearers 
 The identification of a potential human rights duty-bearer ought 
to be justified. Human rights duties do not simply bind anyone who 
 can be bound. At this stage of the argument, authors tend to diverge. 
Some defend an interactional or inter-individual view of human rights 
  35   See Shue,  Basic Rights , 52–53, 60. 
  36   See Shue,  Basic Rights , 52. 
  37   See Beitz and Goodin, “Introduction,” 13. 
  38   See Shue,  Basic Rights , 59, 61, 173. 
  39   See Shue,  Basic Rights , 120. 
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duty-bearers that regards individuals as sole duty-bearers,  40  while others 
defend an institutional view of human rights duty-bearers. Among those 
authors who have adopted the institutional view, some see institutions 
as mere mediators or representatives of individuals and their duties and 
not as direct duty-bearers,  41  whereas others regard institutions as duty-
bearers in their own right.  42  Finally, institutionalist accounts are divided 
into two groups: a first group considers that individuals may bear human 
rights duties concurrently with institutions,  43  while the second one sees 
individuals as only bearing residual or subsidiary human rights duties.  44  
 This essay defends an institutional model of human rights duties: insti-
tutions of jurisdiction are primary duty-bearers, not only as a mediating 
framework for individual duties, or with residual or subsidiary duties of 
individuals, but in their own right. This model excludes from duty other 
international subjects, such as other individuals, states or international 
institutions that do not have jurisdiction, even though, as I will argue later 
in this essay, those subjects bear responsibilities for human rights. 
 There are two normative arguments for an institutional account of 
human rights duty-bearers. First of all, there is an argument from equality. 
As explained previously, human rights are inherently relational and mutual 
just as the equal political status they constitute. As such, human rights are 
not only rights of all, but also rights  against all . We are all duty-bearers of the 
rights we hold. Importantly, what this means is that we are all duty-bearers 
 together and not separately. Owing duties together requires the creation of 
institutions as duty-bearers to be able to bear those duties together. Second, 
is the argument from democracy. Given the mutual relationship between 
political equality and human rights, it should come as no surprise that 
democracy is the political process through which decisions about our equal 
rights and duties and the specification and allocation of those duties should 
be taken. And this may only be done through institutional processes. 
 Besides these normative arguments for the institutional model of 
human rights duty-bearers, one may also mention practical ones. The first 
and most important argument usually made for the institutional account 
of human rights duty-bearers is an argument of feasibility (“ought implies 
can”).  45  Institutions are the only ones to have the sustainable capacity to 
respect and uphold human rights duties.  46  According to Shue, institutions 
are a way of spreading the burden or costs of respecting human rights on 
  40   See e.g., Griffi n,  On Human Rights , 104–5. 
  41   See e.g., Shue,  Basic Rights . 
  42   See e.g., Nickel, “How Human Rights”; Pogge, “Human Rights and Human Responsibil-
ities,” 8 ff.; Nickel,  Making Sense of Human Rights , 38 – 41; Beitz,  The Idea of Human Rights , 113 ff. 
  43   See e.g., Shue,  Basic Rights , 56–57; Thomas Pogge, “Shue on Rights and Duties,” in Beitz 
and Goodin, eds.,  Global Basic Rights , 113–30. 
  44   See e.g., Nickel, “How Human Rights”; Nickel,  Making Sense of Human Rights , 38 – 41; 
Beitz,  The Idea of Human Rights , 113 ff. 
  45   See Shue,  Basic Rights , 166 ff.; Beitz and Goodin, “Introduction,” 9 and 15. 
  46   See also Nickel, “How Human Rights,” 81. 
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the members of the community in a feasible manner and in a way that cen-
tralizes the resources available. Second, institutions secure the mediation 
of human rights duties between all individuals involved.  47  In so doing, 
they also help direct human rights duties to their respective bearers by 
identifying the right-holders and duty-bearers of any given human right 
at the same time and in a systematic fashion. 
 B.  The identification of institutional human rights duty-bearers 
 So, which institutions should be the bearers of human rights duties? 
I will distinguish between primary institutional duty-bearers of human 
rights — whether they are states of jurisdiction or, still exceptionally to 
date, international institutions of jurisdiction — and subsidiary individual 
bearers of human rights duties. 
 1.  The Primary Human Rights Duty-Bearers: Institutions of Jurisdiction. 
 The primary human rights duty-bearers are institutions of jurisdiction, 
i.e., the institutions that have jurisdiction over the right-holders. They 
are mostly states, but this may also arguably be the case of international 
institutions. 
 i. Institutions of jurisdiction in general. It follows from the egalitarian 
dimension of human rights that the institutions that bear human rights 
duties should be those of the political community in which the right-holders 
have equal and interdependent stakes, but also those that have jurisdic-
tion over the right-holders and are in a jurisdictional relationship to them. 
This is how human rights arise in international human rights law and prac-
tice: from a relationship of jurisdiction.  48  When there is no relationship of 
jurisdiction between an entity and a group of individuals, those individ-
uals do not have human rights against that entity and that entity has no 
human rights duties toward those people (e.g., Article 1 ECHR). Jurisdic-
tion both requires the recognition of human rights normatively (jurisdic-
tion as a normative trigger of human rights) and provides the conditions 
for the corresponding duties to be feasible (jurisdiction as a practical con-
dition of human rights). As a matter of fact, the two relationships may 
be regarded as mutually constitutive to the extent that there is a general 
human rights’ positive duty for states to exercise jurisdiction and hence 
to incur human rights duties, and, when they have lost its effective use, 
to regain it in order to be able to protect human rights effectively.  49  That 
( prima facie paradoxical) mutuality between human rights and jurisdiction 
  47   See Shue,  Basic Rights , 166 ff.; Beitz and Goodin, “Introduction,” 15–16. 
  48   See Besson, “The Extra-Territoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights,” 
based on European Court of Human Rights,  Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom , 
July 7, 2011 (appl. no. 55721/07). 
  49   See e.g., European Court of Human Rights,  Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and 
Russia , October 19 2012 (appl. no. 43370/04, 18454/06, and 8252/05). 
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is a reminder of the existence of the moral right to have human rights in 
the first place and, more correctly in this context, of the moral duty to have 
human rights duties. This is also arguably the meaning of Article 28 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and its “entitlement” to 
an institutional order, domestic or international, where human rights may 
be realized and hence arise in the first place. 
 In a nutshell, jurisdiction refers to  de facto authority, that is to say the 
practical political and legal authority that is not yet legitimate or justi-
fied authority, but claims to be, or at least is held to be, legitimate by its 
subjects.  50   Qua de facto authority, jurisdiction consists in effective, overall 
and normative power or control (whether it is prescriptive, executive, or 
adjudicative). It amounts to more than the mere exercise of coercion or 
power, as a result: it also includes a normative dimension by reference to 
the imposition of reasons for action on its subjects and the corresponding 
appeal for compliance. 
 Importantly, jurisdiction applies both on the domestic territory and 
extraterritorially. Jurisdiction is functional therefore, and not primarily 
personal or territorial, although personal and territorial control may be 
used as shorthand criteria when assessing jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is an 
all or nothing matter and not a matter of degree: either one is giving rea-
sons for action and requiring compliance, or one is not. It cannot, there-
fore, be split into levels and acquired gradually. And this applies whether 
jurisdiction is territorial or extraterritorial. Of course, depending on the 
context and based on their concrete and dynamic character, different 
human rights duties will arise, and this is particularly evident for positive 
duties to protect that require specific control. 
 ii. States of jurisdiction. To date, the institutions that exercise jurisdiction 
under international law are primarily states. Interestingly, the identity 
of particular institutional duty-bearers within the state or institution of 
jurisdiction may be reconstructed from rules of attribution of conduct and 
responsibility used to attribute remedial responsibility in case of violation 
of the state of jurisdiction’s human rights duties in practice.  51  States bear 
human rights duties for and through various agents whose conduct may 
be attributed to it. This includes the states’ own agents, of course. Those 
agents in any given state of jurisdiction include all its organs, whether 
legislative, executive or judicial and whether central or decentralized as 
in federal states (e.g., Article 4 ARSIWA  52  ). They also include those that 
are borrowed from other states in some cases (e.g., Article 6 ARSIWA). 
  50   See  Joseph  Raz ,  Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 
( Oxford :  Clarendon Press ,  1995 ),  215 . 
  51   Despite its retroactive infl uence on the latter, the question of the allocation of remedial 
responsibilities for the violation of human rights duties should be carefully delineated con-
ceptually from that of the allocation of human rights duties in the fi rst place. 
  52   Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; see UN Gen-
eral Assembly, Resolution 56/83 (December 12, 2001). 
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As I will explain now, states also bear human rights duties, under certain 
conditions, “for” private actors and international institutions. 
 States bear human rights duties with respect to the actions or omissions 
of private actors. They do so, both when the acts of private individuals 
may be attributed to the state and the state bears indirect duties as a result, 
and when the state bears direct positive duties of its own to protect against 
private actors. 
 First, then, because certain acts of private actors may be attributed to the 
state, the state bears duties in those cases as if those actors were its agents. 
One may imagine different cases: Private actors are exercising elements of 
governmental authority (e.g., Article 5 ARSIWA); their conduct is directed or 
controlled effectively by the state ( de facto organs) (e.g., Article 8 ARSIWA); 
their conduct was carried out in the absence or default of the official 
authorities (e.g., Article 9 ARSIWA); or, finally, their conduct is acknowl-
edged by the state as its own (e.g., Article 11 ARSIWA). 
 Second, states also bear positive duties of their own to protect right-
holders against the conduct of private actors under certain conditions.  53  
Those positive duties include duties to prevent violations by private 
actors, for instance through private or criminal legislation or police actions, 
but also to remedy them if the duties to prevent violation have failed, for 
instance through the judicial system. Those duties to prevent are duties of 
due diligence subject to strict conditions: the state could and should have 
known about the private threat, first, and it was reasonable to expect it to 
intervene, second. The mere fact that the violation occurred is not enough 
for the duty to prevent to be regarded as breached. 
 States may also bear human rights duties in relation to the activities of 
international institutions. One may distinguish between the indirect obli-
gations that arise from the potential later attribution of acts committed by 
international institutions to states, on the one hand, and the obligations 
to protect from international institutions that fall directly on states, on the 
other. 
 First, in cases in which states’ organs act for an international institution, 
the latter’s conduct may be attributed to them provided they share effec-
tive control over them (e.g., Articles 6-7 DARIO  54  and Article 57 ARSIWA). 
What this means in retrospect is that states bear human rights duties in 
relation to the acts or omissions of international organizations when they 
(also) control the agents acting for the organization. Other means of 
attribution of responsibility of the organization to its member states, such 
as aid or assistance, direction and control, or coercion of the organization 
by a state (Articles 58-62 DARIO), are not available in the case of human 
rights’ violations and do not give rise to duties for states accordingly. 
  53   See e.g., European Court of Human Rights,  O’Keeffe v. Ireland , January 28, 2014 (appl. 
no. 35810/09). 
  54   Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations; see UN General 
Assembly, Resolution 66/100 (December 9, 2011). 
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International human rights law does not indeed generate duties for the 
organization itself, but only for its member states, and the existence of 
corresponding duties of the organization is a condition for the attribution 
of responsibility to member states under those provisions. 
 In some cases, however, states may try to escape their human rights 
duties by transferring competences to international institutions that have 
distinct personality, but do not have jurisdiction over the correspond-
ing right-holders and do not bear human rights duties of their own, as a 
result. True, states do not incur responsibility for those acts by the mere 
fact of membership in the international institution (e.g., Article 62 DARIO) 
and may not therefore be regarded as bearing related human rights duties 
in retrospect. However, this potential abuse of membership in an interna-
tional institution has led to the development of a regime of international 
attribution of responsibility to states for the intentional circumventing of 
 their human rights duties through (membership in) an international insti-
tution and the conduct of the latter; states are subject to attribution of 
responsibility even when the act in question is not internationally wrongful 
for the international institution itself (e.g., Article 61 DARIO, within the 
boundaries of Article 62 DARIO). 
 What this means, secondly, is that states are ascribed an international 
human rights-based positive duty of diligence to make sure that their 
membership in the organization and the activity of the organization do 
not prevent them from protecting human rights and that human rights 
protection provided by the organization is equivalent to their interna-
tional human rights law duties.  55  This comes close to a state duty to pro-
tect that may be understood along the lines of their duty to protect against 
private actors. It is more limited, however, to the extent that it leaves a gap 
in cases where states could not have reasonably anticipated the problem 
or have secured some minimal equivalent safeguards. 
 iii. International institutions of jurisdiction. There is nothing in this account 
that precludes extending the burden of human rights duties beyond states 
and especially to international institutions, provided they have jurisdiction. 
Based on the egalitarian reading of human rights of international human 
rights law and practice proposed earlier, what is required, however, is for 
these institutions to amount to political communities where both political 
equality may be claimed and exercised, and where the institutions have the 
kind of overall and effective normative control discussed before. 
 This is by no means easy to achieve beyond the state. To date, first, there 
is no international political community and not even regional ones besides 
states either.  56  Moreover, the circumstances of political equality, which imply 
  55   See e.g., European Court of Human Rights,  Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. 
Switzerland , November 26, 2013 (appl. no. 5809/08). 
  56   See  Samantha  Besson ,  “Human Rights and Democracy in a Global Context – Decoupling 
and Recoupling,”  Ethics and Global Politics  4 , no.  1 ( 2011 ):  19 – 50 . 
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being in a certain relationship to one another, i.e., sharing a social context,  57  
are not yet given at the international level. Second, most international insti-
tutions do not have the required overall and effective normative control over 
their individual subjects, if they have any, to amount to having jurisdiction. 
 There is one glaring exception to the lack of political community and 
jurisdiction beyond the state, however, and that is the European Union 
(EU). First of all, the EU is generally regarded as a political community 
where individual stakes are sufficiently equal and interdependent. The 
EU Treaties actually recognize those individual subjects as “citizens” and 
guarantee their political equality (Article 9 TEU). Secondly, the EU exer-
cises overall and effective normative power or control over its individual 
subjects. This has been confirmed recently in the context of the negotia-
tions of accession to the ECHR where the existence of EU jurisdiction has 
been recognized by analogy to member states’ jurisdiction (e.g., Article 1 
par. 4 of the 2013 Draft Agreement on the Accession of the EU to the ECHR 
(Draft Accession Agreement)). 
 It is no wonder, then, that the EU amounts to the only international insti-
tution to date to have its own human rights regime (Art. 6(1) TEU) and to 
incur direct human rights duties under that regime. It is also the only one 
to be bound directly by international human rights law. Thus, the EU has 
been a party to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (UNCRPD) since 2010, and is in negotiation to join the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Article 6(2) TEU).  58  
 2.  The subsidiary bearers of duties to have human rights duties: Individuals. 
 On the proposed institutional account of human rights duty-bearers, 
individuals bear human rights duties only as residual duty-bearers. Those 
duties have also been described as “back-up” duties by James Nickel.  59  
 Importantly, those duties are subsidiary, and not concurrent to the 
human rights duties of institutions of jurisdiction, i.e., states’ duties or 
the EU’s duties. The latter have indirect and direct positive human rights 
duties to protect against violations of human rights caused by individuals. 
Individuals’ duties only arise when their institutions have failed or before 
they have set up their institutions. 
 The failure of institutions in this sense amounts to more than the mere 
violation of human rights duties by the state or institution of jurisdiction, 
however. It corresponds to the loss of effective normative control and 
  57   See  David  Miller ,  “National Responsibility and Global Justice,” in  Ronald  Tinnevelt and 
 Helder de  Schutter , eds.,  Nationalism and Global Justice, David Miller and His Critics ( London : 
 Routledge ,  2011 )  25 ; David Miller, “A Response,” in Tinnevelt and de Schutter, eds.,  Nation-
alism and Global Justice , 192; David Miller,  National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 56 ff. 
  58   See the 2013 Draft Accession Agreement of the EU to the ECHR:  http://www.coe.int/t/
dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1%282013%29008rev2_
EN.pdf . 
  59   See Nickel,  Making Sense of Human Rights , 40 – 41. 
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hence of jurisdiction in the polity. To that extent, individual back-up duties 
ought to be distinguished from what other authors have regarded as 
subsidiary individual duties that are triggered as second-order duties 
in case of single violations of human rights duties by state institutions.  60  
As a matter of fact, they are not strictly speaking “human rights” duties, 
but duties to have human rights duties and hence to regain institu-
tional jurisdiction as a state or institution of jurisdiction in order to 
then be able to bear those human rights duties.  61  
 The individuals concerned are those belonging to the political com-
munity, or about to belong to it through the exercise of jurisdiction. This 
is determined, just as were the relevant institutions in the previous sec-
tion, by reference to the conditions of political equality, i.e., their sharing 
equal and interdependent stakes. Importantly, individual duties to have 
human rights duties, when they arise, are held collectively as shared 
duties. This may be explained by reference to the egalitarian nature of 
human rights and the fact that we are all right-holders and duty-bearers 
at the same time. 
 A question that arises in this context is whether subgroups of indi-
viduals may also be regarded as bearers of duties to have human rights 
duties in circumstances of failed or nascent jurisdiction. One may think 
of transnational corporations or nongovernmental organizations. The 
political and egalitarian dimensions of human rights would tend to deny 
this possibility and to favor only inclusive groups, and groups that 
endeavour to politically represent all individuals in the community, 
such as liberation movements or transitional governments. This is not 
to say that other individuals may not incur responsibilities for human 
rights, as we will see, but those should not be conflated with duties to 
have human rights duties. 
 C.  The allocation of human rights duties to institutional human rights 
duty-bearers 
 The allocation of human rights duties takes place if possible within 
the institution of jurisdiction, but also, in case of competing jurisdictions, 
between institutions of jurisdiction themselves. 
 The assignment or allocation of duties to specific duty-bearers raises 
questions of fairness and also must be justified. 
 The primary allocation of the aggregate burden of human rights duties 
to the polity and its institutions ought to be justified in itself. Just as the 
burden of duties allocated to institutions is an aggregate of duties, the 
  60   See e.g., Griffi n,  On Human Rights , 104–5. 
  61   This duty to have human rights duties of individuals in a given political community, 
which is a duty correlative to a right (to have human rights), is distinct from the responsibil-
ities to have human rights of all discussed below. 
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grounds for the allocation to the institutions may also be deemed as an 
aggregate of various justifications. As a result, one need not choose 
between harm, causality, special ties, benefit or capacity as grounds of 
moral responsibility,  62  and all can be subsumed under an aggregate justifi-
cation of human rights duties.  63  By contrast, the subsequent reallocation of 
human rights duties to specific organs of the state or institutions of juris-
diction, and/or the attribution of derived (criminal or private law) duties 
to individuals must be justified individually. 
 In the assessment of the justification of an assignment of human rights 
duties to specific duty-bearers, the reasonableness of the overall burden 
and of the cost also needs to be taken into account in addition to the 
grounds for assigning the duties. Given the limited resources available at 
any given time and the numerous duties that may have to be assigned, pri-
orities must be made in terms of the degree of resources allocated to any 
given right, but also in terms of the rights to which those resources ought 
to be allocated. Those questions are morally indeterminate, of course.  64  
All the same, robust egalitarian distribution principles should apply. The 
strength of the specific duties and of the threats to the protected interest 
may also provide additional arguments of priority.  65  
 In view of the moral complexity of the allocation of human rights duties 
and of the priorities to be set, the quality of the institutional process is 
essential to the justification of the allocation. Democratic institutions offer 
a procedural framework in which human rights duties can be deliberated 
over and allocated in an inclusive and egalitarian fashion. The need to 
allocate human rights duties in context also explains why the domestic 
institutions of jurisdiction themselves are best positioned to do so. Of 
course, international human rights institutions may and should assist 
institutions of jurisdiction, that is, states and the EU, in the subsidiary 
allocation of the specific duties to specific institutional bodies and to 
individuals. This only takes place  ex post , however, and in the context 
of concrete cases pertaining to the remedial responsibilities for a viola-
tion of specific human rights duties. 
 One last remark is in order with respect to the allocation to individuals 
of the collective duties to have human rights duties, (i.e., during the pre-
institutional or post-institutional stage). The allocation of the aggregate 
burden of human rights duties to those individual duty-bearers finds its 
justification in the aggregate set of reasons for those duties. Of course, 
once those duties are individualized, the question of justification will arise 
anew and, this time, without an institutional and procedural framework 
  62   See Miller, “Distributing Responsibilities,” 464 ff.; Miller,  National Responsibility and 
Global Justice , 98 ff. 
  63   See Beitz and Goodin, “Introduction,” 17. 
  64   See Nickel, “How Human Rights,” 81. 
  65   See Nickel,  Making Sense of Human Rights , 85. 
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to decide on the question in a democratic way. There would seem to be 
no other choice than to resort to strategic moral thinking in these sorts of 
cases. 
 In an increasing number of cases, the question has arisen of how to allocate 
human rights duties among many institutions of jurisdiction. Those cases 
correspond to circumstances in which many institutions (i.e., states and/or 
international institutions) exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the same right-
holders, such as occupation or collective peacekeeping operations. The sepa-
rate allocation of the respective human rights duties to the same organs (e.g., 
civil administration in an occupied state) or to different ones but engaged in 
the same activities (e.g., renditions officers) threatens human rights protection 
in practice and renders remedial responsibilities opaque. 
 The problem is difficult to remedy because neither states nor international 
institutions of jurisdiction have the shared or encompassing institutional 
framework to allocate duties together with another state or institution. 
Because human rights duties follow and require jurisdiction and because 
jurisdiction, like authority, is exclusive, the allocation of human rights duties 
itself is exclusive to the institution of jurisdiction. International human 
rights duties are primarily unilateral duties owed by one institution or state 
at a time, and not by all other state parties as multilateral duties. 
 In this context, international human rights institutions could and should 
play an important role as subsidiary external allocators of human rights 
duties.  66  Regrettably, however, their role in practice is still limited to the  ex 
post allocation of remedial responsibilities for violations of human rights 
duties.  67  The question then is whether those duties should be shared, thus 
preventively emulating the joint attribution of conduct to the states and 
institutions of jurisdiction sharing effective control and the corresponding 
allocation of joint international remedial responsibilities to the respective 
states or institutions.  68  Even if the duties are not shared, one may argue 
that their allocation should be coordinated transnationally in cases of 
concurrent jurisdiction based on the duties themselves. In such circum-
stances, indeed, the effective protection of the interest at stake requires 
jurisdictional coordination. 
 In fact, the question gets even more pressing when an international insti-
tution and one of its member states exercise concurrent jurisdiction. Inter-
national institutions usually use states and organs of the state as agents of 
the institution. And this means that they could organize the sharing of the 
  66   See e.g., the pending case before the European Court of Human Rights,  Hassan v. United 
Kingdom (appl. no. 29750/09) (on concurrent jurisdiction by the United Kingdom and the 
United States). 
  67   See also Samantha Besson, “Science without Borders and the Boundaries of Human 
Rights – Who Owes the Human Right to Science?”  European Journal of Human Rights (2015): 
forthcoming. 
  68   See e.g., European Court of Human Rights,  Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom , July 7, 2011 
(appl. no. 27021/08). 
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effective control of a given state organ with that state in advance, and hence 
coordinate the allocation of its human rights duties. As a matter of fact, the 
institutional structure of the international institution itself makes such a 
coordinated or even shared allocation of human rights duties possible. 
 This question is particularly interesting in the EU. Potential cases of con-
current jurisdiction are numerous there. One may think of cases in which 
EU member states implement EU secondary law or where the EU and 
member states have complementary competencies. So far, the allocation 
of EU human rights duties in the EU has followed the allocation of com-
petencies, and in case of complementary competencies, the allocation has 
been done by reference to normative control and its exclusive attribution 
to either the state or the EU. Cases of concurrent jurisdiction and hence 
of shared human rights duties have never been considered, as a result. 
Things may change after the EU’s accession to the ECHR. Indeed, the EU 
will become the first international institution to join the ECHR and hence 
to become a potentially concurrent duty-bearer to states in that regime. 
 IV .  The Identification of Human Rights Responsibility-Bearers 
and the Allocation of Responsibilities for Human Rights 
 Alongside the human rights duties of some, all subjects of international 
law also incur distinct international responsibilities for human rights. 
After elaborating on their content and specification, I will turn to the iden-
tification of their bearers and to their allocation. 
 A.  The specification of the responsibilities for human rights 
 Responsibilities for human rights are part and parcel of the international 
responsibilities for global justice that arose slowly between the 1940s and the 
1970s with the adoption of international law and institutions active in the 
monitoring and protection of human rights. While (domestic or regional) 
institutions of jurisdiction have remained the addressees of human rights 
duties, other individuals, states, and international institutions have since then 
increasingly been considered as concurrent bearers of responsibilities for the 
protection of human rights by the primary duty-bearers of those rights. 
 Those responsibilities are captured by the broad concept of a respon-
sibility  for human rights. In short, they are responsibilities to (i) hold 
accountable (monitor, ensure compliance), (ii) assist or aid (promote, train; 
mostly through cooperation) and (iii) intervene (as an  ultima ratio only).  69  
They include responsibilities to protect and remedy, but also responsibil-
ities to respect.  70  Some are preventive while others are remedial. 
  69   See Beitz,  The Idea of Human Rights , 109 and 163. 
  70   Not all responsibilities to respect correspond to a right, however, and hence not all 
responsibilities to respect human rights are directed and owed to those right-holders. 
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 The primary example, of course, is the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) 
of all states in the international community that was endorsed by the 
United Nations (UN) through a General Assembly Resolution in 2009.  71  
Another example is the “corporate responsibilities to respect human 
rights”  72  developed in the context of the United Nations’ effort to curtail 
the negative impact of multinational corporations on human rights’ pro-
tection, and that bear on corporations but also, concurrently albeit differ-
ently, on their states of origin. Finally, the 2011 Maastricht Principles on 
Extra-territorial Obligations (ETO) of States refer to the “responsibilities” 
for human rights of other states besides the states of jurisdiction’s (terri-
torial and extraterritorial) human rights “duties” (e.g., Article 29 ETO).  73  
They echo the so-called “supporting”  74  responsibilities of “international 
cooperation and assistance” under the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 2(1) ICESCR) that bear on all 
states parties to the Covenant. 
 The primary characteristic of responsibilities for human rights, and 
what distinguishes them from human rights duties, besides the identity 
of their bearers, of course, is that we lack ways of specifying their con-
tent and bearers, and of allocating the former to the latter.  75  Second, even 
when specified and allocated,  76  responsibilities for human rights are not 
directed to a right-holder and are not correlative to a right. Finally, most of 
the time, they have a content distinct from human rights duties, for they 
do not protect the interests at stake directly, but preserve the ability of the 
states or international institutions of jurisdiction to protect them. 
 The difference between responsibilities for human rights and human rights 
duties explains why the former are not subsidiary, secondary, or default 
human rights duties, but concurrent responsibilities that apply alongside 
human rights duties.  77  Responsibilities for human rights are related to and 
coexist with human rights duties to the extent that they help prevent human 
rights violations by human rights duty-bearers or remedy those violations 
when human rights duty-bearers are unable or unwilling to fulfill their duties. 
  71   See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 63/308,  The Responsibility to Protect , 
A/RES/63/308 (14 September 2009). 
  72   See United Nations,  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights , 2011,  http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf . 
  73   See the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 2011,  http://www.fi dh.org/IMG/pdf/maastricht-
eto-principles-uk_web.pdf . 
  74   See United Nations,  Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights , 2012,  http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/OHCHR_ExtremePovertyandHumanRights_
EN.pdf , par. 93–94. 
  75   See Beitz,  The Idea of Human Rights , 117, 163. 
  76   The distinction between human rights duties and responsibilities for human rights is not 
one of perfect versus imperfect duties, therefore. 
  77   See also Beitz,  The Idea of Human Rights , 108; David Miller, “The Responsibility to Protect 
Human Rights,” in Lukas H. Meyer, ed.,  Legitimacy, Justice, and Public International Law (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 233. 
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 B.  The identification of the responsibility-bearers for human rights 
 Just as their content, the bearers of the responsibilities for human rights 
are usually indeterminate. They are diffusely vested in the “international 
community” at large.  78  The difficulty is that this community is not (yet) 
institutionalized: it consists of various individuals, states, and interna-
tional institutions, some regional and some global, but never, in the latter 
case, in an inclusive fashion. 
 As individuals, first of all, we all bear a shared responsibility for the 
respect of human rights as the primary constituency of the international 
community.  79  Importantly, and for the reasons of equality mentioned 
before, that responsibility is collective and we bear it together as a result. 
Practically, of course, there are important coordination limitations to 
what individuals can do collectively at the global level. This is why, in the 
absence of institutionalization of the international community, other and 
especially institutional subjects of international law are more likely to act 
upon their responsibilities for human rights. 
 Second, then, the states other than the human rights duty-bearing states 
of jurisdiction may be seen as instruments of global justice through which 
we institutionalize our shared individual responsibilities for human 
rights.  80  Importantly, states are bearers of responsibilities in their own 
right, and not only as a way of mediating their constituency’s responsibil-
ities for human rights. Again, states cannot do much on their own without 
institutional coordination at the global level. 
 This explains why, finally, international institutions are often regarded 
as bearers of our responsibilities for human rights to the extent that they 
provide an institutional framework for state cooperation.  81  Again, one may 
make the argument that they should not only do so in mediating our respon-
sibilities, but also in their own right  qua subjects of international law. 
 C.  The allocation of responsibilities for human rights to responsibility-bearers 
 The allocation of responsibilities for human rights to their bearers is one 
of the most difficult issues currently before us. The difficulties have to do 
with the many potential grounds for allocating those responsibilities and 
with the lack of procedures for actually assigning those responsibilities to 
various bearers. 
  78   See Beitz,  The Idea of Human Rights , 108. 
  79   Those responsibilities for human rights of all individuals are distinct from (and concur-
rent to) the subsidiary human rights duties of individuals in a given political community 
pre-institutionalization or post-failure of their institutions, just as the responsibilities for 
human rights of all states are distinct from (and concurrent to) the human rights duties of 
any given state of jurisdiction. 
  80   See Miller, “The Responsibility to Protect Human Rights,” 241. 
  81   See Shue,  Basic Rights , 178. 
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 1. Grounds. There are various grounds or justifications for preventive or 
remedial international responsibilities for human rights. Those grounds 
range from outcome to causality, harm, capacity, benefit, or special ties.  82  
Depending on the case, any of them may be chosen as ground of individ-
ualized responsibility for human rights, but nothing prevents them from 
all applying at the same time or some of them in some cases and others in 
different cases.  83  
 Interesting questions follow, however. One of them is the issue of poten-
tial conflicts among responsibilities for human rights. David Miller rightly 
suggests choosing the strongest connection in such cases.  84  Another, non-
exclusive, possibility would be to foresee cascades of responsibilities with 
some grounds kicking in when other more strongly connected grounds of 
responsibilities have not been acted upon. It seems, however, that there 
should be a priority of the outcome responsibility of the state that is also 
the duty-bearer of human rights duties in case of violation of its duties. 
Other states cannot have to make up entirely for the failure of the domes-
tic institutions to comply with their human rights duties. 
 Another important question pertains to the cost of one’s responsibil-
ities. Responsibilities for human rights can only be justified as long as 
respecting them can be done without incurring excessive costs in each 
case.  85  This is a constraint similar to the one applicable to human rights 
duties. The question is even more complicated, however, in the context of 
the responsibilities for human rights as there usually are many potential 
responsibility-bearers on many different grounds. 
 2. Process . There is a difference between identifying an entity as poten-
tially responsible and assigning responsibility to her.  86  The assignment 
of responsibility requires spreading the burden over various agents and 
assessing the fairness of the overall individual burden on each of them. 
 By reference to what applies to human rights duties, allocation of inter-
national responsibilities for human rights requires an institutional and pro-
cedural framework.  87  To date, however, there is no universal international 
institutional framework or procedure for the aggregation of responsibilities 
for human rights on all grounds and to all its subjects. As a result, the allo-
cation of international responsibilities for human rights remains a matter 
of judgment for each potential responsibility-bearer in each case. Potential 
responsibility bearers must resort to individual and strategic or pragmatic 
thinking in the absence of assurance about others’ actions.  88  One cannot 
  82   See Miller, “Distributing Responsibilities,” 464 ff.; Miller,  National Responsibility and 
Global Justice , 98 ff. 
  83   See also Beitz,  The Idea of Human Rights , 170–71. 
  84   See Miller, “Distributing Responsibilities,” 468 ff. 
  85   See Miller, “The Responsibility to Protect Human Rights,” 241 ff. 
  86   See Miller,  National Responsibility and Global Justice , 82–83. 
  87   See Shue,  Basic Rights , 166 ff., 180. 
  88   See Shue,  Basic Rights , 160–61. 
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exclude from all this that no one will act in the end.  89  Of course, the con-
sequence of this “uneven web of disaggregated responsibilities to act”  90  
is insecurity. This has also been referred to as the protection gap between 
human rights duties and responsibilities for human rights.  91  
 V .  Toward Global Jurisdiction and Global Human Rights 
Duties? 
 If the proposed analysis of the EU as sole international institution with 
human rights duties holds, one may want to think about the development 
of jurisdiction and hence of human rights duties beyond the domestic 
polity as a global trend for universal international institutions (e.g., at the 
UN). The question, however, is whether this quiet evolution in interna-
tional human rights law could not also be considered a revolution in 
political and democratic terms. 
 Assessing this evolution and its desirability is both a matter of scale 
and a matter of density. It is a matter of scale, first, because transposing 
the EU experiment to a global level means potentially raising the spectre 
of a world-state. It is also a matter of density, second, because even if the 
institutional integration of states at play in the EU can be conceived in a 
non-statist way, it questions the state model and hence the way in which 
individual equality, human rights and democracy have been guaranteed 
to date. 
 The first option is not desirable at the global level. The idea of a world-
wide political community and hence of a global democracy  stricto sensu is 
not only implausible, but normatively undesirable. It would undermine 
the productive tension between human rights and democracy presented 
earlier in the essay.  92  Short of a revolution in international human rights 
law, but also in the way we have protected political equality and democ-
racy so far through the institution of different states and the international 
law regime that guarantees those institutions, the perspective of a world-
state is simply not appealing normatively. 
 So, one may wonder about the desirability of the second route: the 
development of a multilevel or federal international political community 
of some sort. Although this model leaves the plurality of states in existence, 
and hence saves us at first sight from the downsides of a world-state, the 
difficulty is that once human rights and democracy are recoupled in an 
international institution situated beyond the state, it is difficult to see how 
  89   See Beitz and Goodin, “Introduction,” 22–23. 
  90   Beitz,  The Idea of Human Rights , 173–74. 
  91   See Miller, “The Responsibility to Protect Human Rights,” 246; Miller,  National Responsi-
bility and Global Justice , 274. 
  92   See  Seyla  Benhabib “Claiming Rights Across Borders: International Human Rights and 
Democratic Sovereignty,”  American Political Science Review  103 , no.  4 ( 2009 ):  691 – 704 . 
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one could maintain a general human rights competence at the domestic 
level and, hence, save the state. And the same may be said about the dem-
ocratic unit of reference for the protection of individual equality. So, here 
again, the alternative is between openly turning that entity into a state 
and hence falling back into the scale issue addressed before albeit with 
international human rights law firmly in place, or trying to tame the state 
while integrating it into an international political community at the risk 
of diluting it. 
 As a matter of fact, current developments in the EU are evidence 
of the instability of its unique human rights and citizenship regime 
over time and to the questioning of its member states’ autonomy. The 
EU human rights regime may qualify as a transnational human rights 
regime. To start with, it is not a municipal human rights regime aimed 
at all state institutions — including the local ones in all areas of central 
and local law (e.g., that of a federal state like Switzerland); it is aimed 
at EU institutions — mostly, and only exceptionally at national institutions 
within the scope of EU law. Nor, however, is it an international human 
rights regime setting minimal standards only for states (e.g., that of the 
ECHR or UN human rights conventions), because it sets regular standards 
for the international institution itself, i.e. the EU. 
 The current question, however, is whether EU human rights can 
actually remain the rights of the citizens of a nonmunicipal polity and 
hence of a non-state in the long run. I have argued elsewhere that they 
cannot.  93  
 Practically, first of all, there are signs of the EU’s transformation into a 
municipal or statist polity, albeit a federal one. These transformations and 
especially the human rights-based transformations are actually reminis-
cent of the ones that took place in the United States from the eighteenth cen-
tury onward. One should add the growing impact of international human 
rights law duties of the EU on its internal human rights regime. In short, 
the centralizing experience of domestic, but also of international, human 
rights law in federal entities makes the EU’s transnational project an 
unlikely alternative to the consolidation of a European state in the long run. 
Conceptually, second, there are difficulties with the transnational model 
of human rights of the EU and hence with its transposition to the global 
level. One may indeed question the compatibility between dual or plural 
polities and citizenships, on the one hand, and individual equality and 
human rights, on the other. But maybe it is individual equality itself that 
we should put into question and, ultimately, human rights themselves? 
That, of course, would be quite a revolution both in political theory and in 
practice, and surely one that cannot be started from within human rights 
law and theory itself. 
  93   See Besson, “Human Rights and Democracy in a Global Context.” 
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 VI .  Conclusions 
 States and some so-far rare international institutions, like the EU, are 
the sole bearers of human rights duties under international law. This is a 
well-confirmed practice under international law, and it needs to be taken 
seriously by those human rights theorists who want their theory to guide 
that practice. It is also a practice that may be justified within the proposed 
egalitarian reading of international human rights law. 
 Two key notions one encounters in the international human rights prac-
tice make the consequences of this interpretation less dramatic than its cri-
tiques claim they are: first, human rights duties are related to jurisdiction 
and this is not something states are the only ones to be able to exercize, as 
exemplified by the EU in particular; second, individuals bear subsidiary 
human rights duties before their political communities are institutional-
ized or when their institutions have failed; finally, besides duties, human 
rights give rise to concurrent responsibilities for their respect, promotion, 
and protection on the part of various other international subjects: individ-
uals, other states, and international institutions. Wondering further about 
the quiet but steady evolution of political and legal integration beyond 
the state, and in particular about the consolidation of jurisdiction and the 
human rights duties of the EU, I argued that unless we are ready to start 
a revolution in the way we think of and protect individual equality and, 
hence, not only human rights but democracy itself, it may be better not 
to transpose the EU experiment too quickly to other international institu-
tions of a universal scope. 
 Those theoretical conclusions have practical consequences for how we 
conceive of human rights duties in international law in the future. First 
and foremost, the duties of states and international institutions of juris-
diction should be our priority: they should be held more actively and con-
sistently responsible for violations of their human rights duties, including 
in cases where those violations have been triggered by non-state actors in 
violation of states and international institutions of jurisdiction’s positive 
duties of diligence both territorially and extra-territorially. Second, as to 
non-state actors themselves: we should make the most of their responsibil-
ities to respect and protect, and in particular of the responsibilities of the 
UN for facilitating the cooperation for human rights among states other 
than the state(s) or institution(s) of jurisdiction in any given context. It is 
important not to water down the strength of existing human rights duties 
by trying to expand the scope of duty-bearers to all bearers of responsibilities 
for human rights. It is essential, in particular, to remember to resort when 
possible to moral resources other than human rights and, by extension, to 
legal instruments other than international human rights law. 
 As the new historians of international human rights are slowly uncover-
ing, one of the most curious political developments of the 1990s has been the 
growing inclusion of all humanitarian issues under the roof of human rights. 
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Global justice scholars may be making an analogical mistake when they 
conflate all concerns of justice beyond the state with human rights con-
cerns. While this may have been a fruitful rhetorical and political move 
back then, I hope to have shown that it is certainly not the best way to move 
forward in moral terms, nor the way for human rights and democracy to 
constitute a lasting change in our global political morality. 
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